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When sorry is not an option: CSR reporting and ‘face work’ in a stigmatised industry – 
A case study of Barrick (Acacia) gold mine in Tanzania 
Abstract 
This paper investigates how a stigmatised company mobilised accounting, particularly CSR 
reporting, to manage a crisis of legitimacy and spoiled identity following a series of social and 
environmental crises. Specifically, it uses Goffman’s (1959, 1963) writings on stigma and 
presentation of self and Benoit’s (1995) image restoration theory to explore how a large mining 
company in Tanzania used various strategic responses in striving to distance and dissociate 
itself from the attached ‘stigma’. The evidence shows that, in response to attacks from pressure-
group organisations, rather than apologising for the social and environmental crises, the 
company was preocupied with ‘defensive stigma management’ strategies, including denial and 
refocusing attention, evading responsibility, image bolstering, excuses and dissociation. 
Drawing on our findings, we argue that, rather than making the effects of stigma more visible, 
accounting and CSR disclosures were mobilised to conceal the threats of stigma, manage the 
legitimacy crisis and repair spoiled identity. This study moves beyond the current focus on 
legitimacy in the extant CSR reporting literature, by bringing in the concept of organisational 
stigma to examine stigma management strategies implemented by a company operating in a 
stigmatised industry to avoid, reduce or minimise its audiences’ disapproval. 
 





Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), academics and the public have become increasingly 
sensitive to unsustainable business practices associated with global expansion, thereby eroding 
business organisations’ legitimacy (Bebbington, Larrinaga-Gonzàlez, & Moneva, 2008; 
Palazzo and Scherer, 2006; Scherer, Palazzo, & Seidl, 2013; Zyglidopoulos & Fleming, 2011). 
Arguably, ‘[t]he legitimacy of business has fallen to levels not seen in recent history’ (Porter 
& Kramer, 2011, p.64), widening the scope for companies to be stigmatised (Du & Vieira, 
2012; Goffman, 1963; Tracey & Philips, 2016). In the organisation and management literature, 
the notion of stigma1 has long been widely applied, especially regarding how individuals seek 
to manage their connection with stigma, and how organisational practices reinforce 
stigmatising labelling and classification of individuals such as those from ethnic minorities (see 
Page, 1984; Neu & Wright, 1992; Solomon et al., 2013; Walker, 2008). 
More recently, scholars have begun to focus on stigma at the organisational level (Devers 
et al., 2009; Hudson & Okhuysen, 2009; Warren, 2007). Increasing evidence of discrediting 
events, including bankruptcy, industrial accidents, pollution and hazardous workplace 
conditions, has led to the stigmatisation of companies in sectors such as tobacco, mining, cocoa 
and oil (Devers et al., 2009; Hudson & Okhuysen, 2009; Manning, 2008). This has become 
even more serious for companies operating in extractive industries, where humanitarian and 
ecological problems have historically been embedded in their core operations (Banerjee, 2011; 
Napoleoni, 2008; Reinecke, Arnold, & Palazzo, 2016; Tregidga & Milne, 2006). Owing to the 
large-scale extraction of natural resources and social and environmental conflicts arising from 
their activities, companies operating in this industry are often singled out for causing pollution, 
environmental degradation and social unrest (Campbell, 2012; Lauwo, Otusanya, & Bakre, 
2016; Hilson, 2012; Hilson, Yakovleva, & Banchirigah, 2007). This stigmatisation has 
inevitably continued to damage these companies’ image and identity, with adverse effects on 
their reputation and performance, and negative reactions from stakeholders in the form of 
boycotts and strikes (see Gond et al., 2016; Tracey & Philips, 2016; Warren, 2007). As 
proponents of legitimacy theory suggest, organisations caught engaging in actions that violate 
social, moral, ethical or legal values will suffer reputational loss (Suchman, 1995). 
Nevertheless, a vital question remains unanswered: why do some stigmatised organisations 
                                                 
1 Goffman (1963, p.3) defines stigma as an ‘attribute that is deeply discrediting’ and reduces the bearer from a 
whole person to a tainted one. 
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survive, and indeed thrive, despite the apparent stain associated with their stigmatisation and 
its attendant identity problems (Tracey & Phillips, 2016, p.740)? 
In seeking to provide answers to this puzzle, scholars suggest that companies operating 
in a stigmatised industry, such as mining, proactively protect and repair their image and identity 
in various ways, including lobbying and participating in voluntary initiatives and sponsorship 
to demonstrate their ethicality, responsibility and morality (see Napoleoni, 2008; Campbell, 
2012; Hilson, 2012; Hilson et al., 2007; Lauwo et al., 2016; Lauwo and Otusanya, 2014; 
Tregidga & Milne, 2006). As a result, discourses such as CSR and sustainability have become 
popular in these industries, as evidenced by an increase in social, environmental and 
sustainability reports. Unsurprisingly, mining and oil companies are now considered to be 
global leaders on social responsibility and sustainability: the Global 100 Index reports that 
eight out of the 100 most sustainable firms are in extractive industries (Corporate Knights, 
2015). Yet despite this development, the literature underlines that pressure-group organisations 
(e.g. human rights NGOs) are increasingly criticising extractive companies’ unsustainable 
practices (Du & Vieira, 2012; Tracey & Philips, 2016). For example, Lauwo and Otusanya 
(2014) observe that ecological problems, human rights abuses and other social injustices 
remain prevalent in the Tanzanian mining sector, and that social, humanitarian and ecological 
problems seem to be embedded in and reinforced by the institutional infrastructure of mining 
(such as the Tanzanian Mining Act, 2010 and Mining Policy, 2009). These contradictions 
inevitably render the mining sector, and extractive industries more generally, a site of 
controversy (Hilson et al., 2007; Hilson, 2012; Reinecke et al., 2016; Lauwo, 2016; Lauwo et 
al., 2016; Lauwo & Otusanya, 2014). Therefore, there is a need to problematise CSR practices 
in this industry, and particularly to explore the strategic responses deployed by companies in 
attempts to manage stigma, as well as ensuing legitimacy crises, and image and identity threats. 
In this paper, we seek to contribute to the literature on corporate legitimacy crises and 
CSR reporting (see Bebbington et al., 2008; O’Donovan, 2002; O’Dwyer, 2002; Roberts, 2003; 
Waddock, 2004) by examining strategies mobilised by a tainted mining company in Tanzania 
to manage a legitimacy crisis, and the threats associated with stigma in its aftermath. 
Specifically, we explore the strategic responses of Barrick Gold Corporation (BGC) and its 
subsidiary, Acacia Mining (formerly known as African Barrick Gold) to a crisis at its North 
Mara site in Tanzania.2 To frame our analysis theoretically, we mobilise Goffman’s (1959, 
                                                 
2 The crisis at North Mara Gold Mine (NMGM) site emerged in the late 1990s, when foreign mining companies 
started to invest in exploring and extracting gold in Tanzania, leading to the mass displacement of local community 
members who originally depended on artisanal mining (Chachage, 1995). Ongoing social unrest at NMGM has 
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1963) notions of stigma and presentation of self in conjunction with Benoit’s (1995) typology 
and projections of image restoration as strategic responses to stakeholder activism in the 
aftermath of the crisis. These are particularly suited to this study because they can be applied 
to analyse how stigmatised organisations’ use various tactics in attempting to avoid or mitigate 
the effects of stigma (Hudson, 2008; Manning, 2008; Warren, 2007). Goffman (1959, 1963) 
and Benoit (1995) provide an appropriate theoretical framework to analyse how organisational 
stigma may damage an organisations image and identity, giving rise to stigma management 
strategies for justification, denial or self-presentation to audiences. As Goffman (1967, p.27) 
argued, ‘when a face has been threatened, face-work must be done’. Similarly Benoit (1995, 
p.2) suggests that ‘those who believe that their face or reputation has been injured or even 
threatened are unlikely to ignore these perils’ and will ‘feel compelled to offer explanations, 
defences, justifications, rationalisations, apologies or excuses’. 
In this context, we make three key contributions. First, we extend current understandings 
of the relationship between corporations, legitimacy crises and CSR reporting (Bebbington et 
al., 2008; Belal & Owen, 2015; Lauwo et al., 2016; Waddock, 2004; O’Donovan, 2002) by 
bringing insights from the stigmatised mining industry in Tanzania. We acknowledge and 
extend subtle distinctions in CSR disclosures between what is said and what is practised (see 
Belal, 2008; Belal & Owen, 2015; Lauwo, 2016; Lauwo et al., 2016; Lauwo & Otusanya, 2014; 
O’Donovan, 2002; Spence, 2007, 2009a; Sikka, 2011). Specifically, we shed light on how a 
local crisis may lead to organisational stigma, and create an adverse context necessitating the 
deployment of a mixture of CSR disclosure strategies to reconstruct the organisation’s image 
and identity. Second, we contribute to the limited accounting literature that has drawn on 
Goffman’s (1959, 1963) writings on stigma and presentation of self, to explore how accounting 
is implicated in reinforcing the stigimatisation of individuals and social control (Detzen & 
Hoffmann, 2018; Graham& Grisard, 2019; Neu & Wright, 1992; Solomon et al., 2013; Walker, 
2008). Although research on organisational stigma has increased in recent years, most 
accounting scholars tend to focus on stigmatisation’s effects on individuals stigmatised by 
affiliation with particular organisations (e.g managers of a failed company), and the role of 
accounting in creating, supporting or maintaining stereotypical characteristics (e.g. race, 
gender) of individual stigmatisation (see McKinley, Ponemon, & Schick, 1996; Miley & Read, 
2016; Neu & Wright, 1992; Ó hÓgartaigh, Ó hÓgartaigh, & Tyson, 2012; Walker, 2008). 
                                                 
been attributed to land and compensation disputes, environmental problems, arguments over economic benefits 
and, lately, allegations of sexual assault by police and security guards at the mining site (see Curtis & Lissu, 2008; 
Lauwo & Otusanya, 2014; Nyakeke, 2013a). 
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Consequently, there is a dearth of knowledge in accounting on organisational stigma in 
particular social contexts (see Jensen & Sandström, 2015). We therefore extend this literature 
theoretically, by foregrounding the concept of organisational stigma to show how stigma 
shapes organisational interactions with stakeholders, focusing on stigma management 
strategies used in CSR disclosures (see Hudson 2008; Manning, 2008; Warren, 2007). Third, 
we advance the accounting literature that has drawn on Benoit’s (1995) image restoration 
theory, to explore the issue of corporate legitimacy crises and CSR reporting (see Bebbington 
et al., 2008; Brennan, Merkl-Davies, & Beelits, 2013). We suggest that Goffman’s (1959, 
1963) sociology can be used in conjunction with Benoit’s (1995) typology to provide rich 
insights into how an organisation manages stigma and associated image threats through various 
strategies in its communications and presentations to audiences. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of 
the literature. Section 3 explores the theoretical framing of our study. Section 4 describes the 
research methods employed and the background of the selected company. Section 5 analyses 
evidence collected from various sources, including sustainability reports, the company’s 
website, press releases, blogs by human rights NGOs, correspondence between BGC and 
human rights NGOs, and other publicly-available social information relating to particular 
‘events’, ‘incidents’ and ‘crises’ affecting the company. Section 6 discusses and draws 
conclusions from the findings. 
2. Overview of the literature 
Research on CSR has expanded across disciplines in recent years. In the accounting literature, 
research on the relationship between corporations, legitimacy and CSR has become more 
sophisticated over the last three decades (Campbell, Craven, & Shrives, 2003; Elsbach, 1994; 
Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Ginzel, Kramer, & Sutton, 1992; Hooghiemstra, 2000; Livesey & 
Kearins, 2002; Moerman & Van der Laan, 2005; Tilling & Tilt, 2010; Vestergaard, 2014). This 
relationship has been explored from a variety of theoretical perspectives, such as stakeholder, 
legitimacy and impression management theories (Elsbach, 1994; Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; 
Ginzel et al., 1992; Hooghiemstra, 2000; Livesey & Kearins, 2002; Parker, 2005; Tilling & 
Tilt, 2010; Vestergaard, 2014). For example, one notion arising from this literature is that 
impression management may play a role in restoring reputation, image and legitimacy at times 
of crisis or change, such as adverse financial performance (e.g. Abrahamson & Park, 1994; 
Courtis, 2004; Solomon et al., 2013), corporate scandals (e.g. Linsley & Kajuter, 2008), 
environmental disasters (e.g. Hooghiemstra, 2000) and major reorganisations (e.g. Arndt & 
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Bigelow, 2000; Ogden & Clarke, 2005). The general conclusion from this literature is that, 
when faced with a crisis situation, companies may deliberately tailor the information they 
disclose to manage their legitimacy and public image (Hopwood, 2009; O’Donovan, 2002). 
Accordingly, companies can manage their public image by deciding on the quantity and range 
of information and the language and verbal tone used in their social and environmental 
disclosures (Cho, Roberts, & Patten, 2010; Milne & Patten, 2002; O’Donovan, 2002; Merkl-
Davies & Brennan, 2007). As a result, CSR has arguably become a new device for corporate 
representation and public relations, as the gap between what is said in CSR disclosures and 
what is practised continues to widen (see Banerjee, 2008, 2014; Hopwood, 2009; Cho et al., 
2010; Spence, 2007, 2009a, 2009b). 
While the extant accounting literature touches on the issue of corporate legitimacy crises 
and CSR reporting (see O’Donovan, 2002; O’Dwyer, 2002; Roberts, 2003), relatively little 
research has been carried out on stigmatised companies’ specific strategic responses to 
stakeholders’ activism in the aftermath of crises to manage the effects of the stigma 
(Bebbington et al., 2008). For example, Bebbington et al. (2008) use Benoit’s (1995) image 
restoration framework to analyse strategic responses in Shell’s reports to address its legitimacy 
and reputation crisis. They suggest that Shell’s reports do not merely adopt impression 
management techniques aimed at ‘making the organisation look good’ (Bebbington et al., 2008, 
p.355), but emerge from a ‘complex organisational environment’ in which differing strategies, 
rationales and discourses are adopted for different activities. Bebbington et al. (2008) call for 
a more sociologically-informed analysis of corporate strategies adopted in the reputation and 
risk management process. Similarly, Arora and Lodhia (2017, p.1290) urge researchers to 
move beyond legitimacy theory in explaining companies’ actions immediately after major 
incidents. 
We respond specifically to Bebbington et al.’s (2008) call and address the concerns of 
Arora and Lodhia (2017), Unerman (2008) and Unerman and Chapman (2014). In so doing, 
we bring to the fore Goffman’s (1959, 1963) writings on stigma and presentation of self and 
Benoit’s (1995) image restroration theory to show how stigma gives rise to various 
management strategies to restore and repair a damaged image (see Brennan et al., 2013; Tracey 
& Phillips, 2016; Walker, 2008; Warren, 2007). We argue that Goffman’s (1959, 1963) and 
Benoit’s (1995) work may be particularly useful in explaining the idea that CSR tactics are 
central defensive mechanisms for managing the effect of organisational stigma. Our interest is 
in how an organisation in the mining sector of a developing country responded to the negative 
consequences of organisational stigmatisation through its subsequent interactions (social 
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disclosures) with external audiences. While existing accounting literature uses Goffman’s 
(1959, 1963) work for individual-level analysis, the central focus of our study is on 
organisational stigma, and particularly how stigma shapes how an organisation communicates 
with external stakeholders (see Hudson, 2008; Manning, 2008; Warren, 2007). We then use 
Benoit’s (1995) image restoration typology to extend and deepen our analysis by examining an 
organisation’s strategy for managing the effect of stigma. Our analysis unveils the strategic 
responses of a stigmatised mining company seeking to conceal, transform or resist the effect 
of stigma, following crises and unpredictable actions that might ‘discredit’ or - ‘muddy’ its 
image and identity. 
2.1 Crisis and stigmatisation in the mining industry 
The mining industry is subject to intense public debate owing to its propensity for negative 
social and environmental impacts, including industrial accidents, environmental degradation, 
health and safety issues, social dislocation of local communities and violations of human rights 
(see Banerjee, 2011; Mutti et al., 2012). Of all industrial sectors, mining may cause the most 
significant irreversible damage to the natural environment and local populations (see Jenkins, 
2004; Kapelus, 2002; Lauwo & Otusanya, 2014; Lauwo et al., 2016; Yakovleva, 2005). There 
is thus an inherent tension between industrial resource extraction and commitment to CSR or, 
as Slack (2012, p.180) posits, a contradiction between commitment to operating responsibly 
and the actual mechanics of the industry. For example, displacing a community of thousands 
of people, most of whom depend on artisanal mining for their livings, in order to dig a massive 
pit and pile up 300 metre-high mountains of waste rock that will inevitably begin to leach 
sulphuric acid and other chemicals into groundwater used by local communities, will contradict 
any claims made by mining companies for social responsibility (see Slack, 2012). This 
inevitably aggravates the legitimacy problems of mining activities, especially in developing 
countries (see Campbell, 2012; Hilson, 2012). 
Consequently, mining has become a stigmatised industry, and this has triggered the 
emergence of human rights NGOs questioning the sector’s ability to behave sustainably (see 
Fonseca, 2010; Garvin et al., 2009). Within the mining industry, gold extraction and processing 
are particularly associated with directly and indirectly harmful outcomes and social and 
environmental impacts, especially in developing countries (Bird, 2016; Lauwo et al., 2016). 
Terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems, such as soils, lakes, rivers and coastal areas, are severely 
affected by conventional gold-mining activities at local and regional levels. High levels of 
heavy metals, including mercury and cyanide, often result from mine drainage and erosion of 
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waste dumps and tailing deposits (Bland, 2014; No Dirty Gold, n.d., 2010; The World Counts, 
2016; Perlez & Johnson, 2010; Asia Dive News, 2013; Rastogi, 2010; Thorpe, 2001; 
Moskowitz, 2014; NBC News, 2009). Human rights NGOs have also raised serious concerns 
about the impact of gold-mining firms’ practices (Oxfam Australia, n.d.). It is widely perceived 
that gold mining makes it difficult for local populations to access clean land and water, impacts 
on their health and livelihoods, changes the social dynamics of communities, and often exposes 
locals to harassment by mine and government security personnel (Earth Institute, 2016; Human 
Rights Watch, 2015a, 2015b). Moreover, as workers continue to complain about unhealthy and 
unsafe working conditions, mining sites have become embroiled in conflict and violence (Bird, 
2016). 
Gold-mining operations have attracted growing criticism in recent years, particularly for 
their controversial activities and practices (Bird, 2016; Christian Aid, 2008). Organised 
reactions have recently intensified, ranging from activism and negative press, to litigation 
instigated by third parties. Influential demonstrations and protests over alleged environmental 
and human rights abuses have been organised beyond national borders, promoting a global 
perception of the negative impact of gold-mining companies’ operations. For instance, 
campaigners from Colombia, Mongolia, South Africa and the USA recently met in London to 
raise public awareness of the damaging effect of gold-mining companies (London Mining 
Network, 2013). Moreover, assisted by various organisations, activists have sought to mobilise 
political support (Blanchfield, 2016), and in some cases have resorted to gatecrashing 
shareholders’ meetings (Beaumont, 2016) and taking violent action against mining 
establishments (Earth First, 2016). In South Africa, for example, mine workers and families of 
those who have died of silicosis and tuberculosis recently filed a class-action suit against 32 
transnational gold-mining companies (Cole, 2016). This action, which was supported by 
influential activist groups including the Treatment Action Campaign and Sonke Gender Justice, 
gained publicity by organising pickets and protest marches (Business Day, 2015.). Similarly, 
300 local people in Thailand filed a lawsuit against a gold-mine operator on health and 
environmental impact grounds (Satrabhaya, 2016; The Nation, 2016; Asian Human Rights 
Commission, 2016). 
The above evidence provides a glimpse into problems in the mining sector, which have 
provoked further campaigns against the industry by human rights NGOs. This is consistent 
with the literature on organisational stigma, which suggests that when an organisation’s core 
sense of self is evaluated negatively by key stakeholders, this may seriously damage its identity 
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and lead to its stigmatisation (Hudson, 2008; Hudson & Okhuysen, 2009).3 Stigmatised mining 
companies attempt to minimise disapproval and mitigate the negative consequences of the 
industry’s core stigmatisation (Grougiou, Dedoulis, & Leventis, 2016). They increasingly 
publish standalone social and environmental reports and adopt voluntary codes of conduct, 
such as the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), as a way of mitigating the effect 
of stigma (see Campbell, 2012; Hilson, 2012; Jensen & Sandström, 2015). CSR reporting has 
thus become a device mobilised by stigmatised companies seeking to preserve and restore their 
image and identity in the adverse context of the mining industry. The next section outlines the 
theoretical framework of the study. 
3. Theoretical background 
We draw on Goffman’s writings on stigma and presentation of self (1959, 1963) and Benoit’s 
(1995) image restoration typology to frame our analysis theoretically.4 Although Goffman’s 
(1959, 1963) work begins at the individual level, his framework, and particularly his analysis 
of how individuals interact after stigmatising events and how they ‘perform’ and 
‘communicate’ (Goffman, 1959, 1963), can be extended to the organisational level (see Hudson 
& Okyusen, 2009; Warren, 2007). This is because, like individuals, organisations are also often 
accountable to multiple social audiences with disparate values, conflicting ideologies and belief 
systems, which may disqualify them from full social acceptance (Roulet, 2015). Our interest is 
in the interactional level, and specifically organisational-level strategies employed by a 
stigmatised mining company to attempt to conceal, transform or resist negative social 
evaluations and project a desirable image and identity (see Hudson, 2008). 
3.1 Understanding organisational stigma 
This section sheds light on how stigmatisation originates at an organisational level by focusing 
on the types of activities and situations that cause organisational stigmatisation and the nature 
of the social context in which it is manifested. Organisation and management scholars have 
sought to develop a comprehensive description of organisational stigma, which differs from 
individual-level stigma and other close constructs such as reputation, legitimacy and status 
                                                 
3 Groups of stakeholders often associate firms with stigmatised industries on the basis of their outputs, routines, 
actions and operations (Hudson & Okhuysen, 2009). Hudson (2008) characterises this type of stigma as ‘core 
stigmatisation’, where an organisation breaches institutional values, thereby creating a perception that its activities 
are incongruent with endorsed standards of corporate behaviour. 
4 Goffman (1963) was among the first scholars to use the concept of stigma to analyse the effect of physical 
attributes (e.g. deformation, race, gender and mental illness) and attributes relating to social practices (e.g. drug 
consumption) on individuals’ social acceptance. 
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(Devers et al., 2009; Mishina & Devers, 2012; Roulet, 2015). Although many organisation and 
management studies have examined stigma, what organisational stigma is and how it emerges 
within a particular social context remain under-researched (see Devers et al., 2009; Jensen & 
Sandström, 2015; Pozner, 2008; Mishina & Devers, 2012). More recent work has begun to 
focus on how organisations seek to manage stigma associated with their operations and 
minimise disapproval (see Devers et al., 2009; Jensen & Sandström, 2015; Hudson & 
Okhyusen, 2009; Manning, 2008). In conceptualising organisational stigma, scholars have 
drawn predominantly on Goffman’s (1963, p.3) concept of individual-level stigma, defined as 
an ‘attribute that is deeply discrediting’, which reduces the bearer ‘from a whole and usual 
person to a tainted, discounted one’.5 More recently, explicitly organisational definitions of 
stigma have been offered (Devers et al., 2009; Hudson & Okhyusen, 2009; Jensen & 
Sandström, 2015; Manning, 2008; Mishina & Devers, 2012). In this context, organisational 
stigma is defined as a label that audience members affix to an organisation, which evokes a 
perception by a collective stakeholders’ group that an organisation has a deep-seated flaw that 
deindividuates and discredits it (Devers et al., 2009; Pozner, 2008; Mishina & Devers, 2012). 
Thus, an organisation becomes stigmatised when salient audiences mark it out, publicly shame 
its conduct as highly inappropriate, and express strong moral disapproval of it (Devers et al., 
2009; Goffman, 1963; Hudson, 2008). As Devers et al. (2009, p.157) stress, a stigmatised 
organisation is viewed as fundamentally flawed, in the sense that is perceived as emblematic 
of the negatively evaluated category to which it is linked. Therefore, stigmatised industries 
(such as tobacco, mining, armies, bathhouses) form a subset of the broad category of ‘dirty 
industries’ (see Hudson, 2008). Hudson (2008, p.253) classifies organisational-level stigma 
into two groups: event stigma, which results from discrete, anomalous episodic events (e.g. 
financial distress, bankruptcy) and core stigma, which is based on the nature of the 
organisation’s core activities (e.g. tobacco, mining, bathhouse). Unlike event stigma, core 
stigma may permanently stain the organisation, preventing full social acceptance (Durand & 
Vergne, 2015). Thus, in the context of this research, organisational stigma relates to the core 
activities of the organisation (mining extraction), which are the dirty work negatively evaluated 
by society (Hudson & Okhyusen, 2009). 
Although stigmatisation may derive from a particular practice, structure or action, 
according to Goffman (1963), stigma relates rather to negative observations made about the 
                                                 
5 Goffman (1963, p.14) refers to three types of stigma: physical deformities, ‘blemishes of individual character’ 
such as dishonesty, and the tribal stigma of race, nation and religion. 
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organisation’s core essence. Thus, stakeholders’ reactions are a key construct in organisational 
stigmatisation, and an important antecedent is a collective perception of generalised value 
incongruence between the focal organisation and stakeholder groups (Hudson, 2008). As 
Devers et al. (2009, p.162) suggest, ‘organizational stigma relies on stereotyping and emerges 
when a critical mass of stakeholder group members reaches this categorization’. 
Although the notion of organisational stigma draws, in part, from the definition of stigma 
at an individual level,6 key distinctions can be observed at an analytical level in the conditions 
or causes of stigma and the possibility of preventing or removing it (see Devers et al., 2009; 
Mishina & Devers, 2012). Unlike individual-level stigma, which focuses on individual life 
consequences associated with individual stigmatisation (such as physical imperfections, race, 
gender and other deviant behaviours), most organisational-level stigma is ‘conduct’ stigma, 
based on the specific actions and choices of organisation members (e.g scandals or the nature 
of the industry) (see Jensen and Sandström, 2015). Whereas stigmatisation at an organisational 
level can be viewed as an active process, individual stigma is often passively acquired through 
the possession of negatively perceived attributes (Link & Phelan, 2001; Roulet, 2015). 
Moreover, although individual-level stigma varies in the level of responsibility attributed to 
the individual for acquiring it, organisations are seen as largely responsible for any stigma that 
they acquire. However, owing to the nature of such stigma, the organisation may shift the blame 
for its effect or distance itself from its taint by isolating or removing offending components 
through decoupling efforts (Devers et al., 2009). Organisational decoupling may include 
removing offending members, shifting geographical location, or completely changing the 
organisation’s identity, but such avenues are rarely available to individuals (Hudson & 
Okhyusen, 2009). Indeed, prevention or removal of stigma is more difficult for individuals, 
who usually remain stuck within stigimatising categories (Goffman, 1963). Thus, 
organisational stigma is generally perceived to be more controllable by stakeholders, but 
investigation of how a collective perception is reached, how the group initiating the 
stigmatisation process seeks to spread its beliefs among other stakeholders, and how these 
beliefs are rationalised to seem more convincing are topics beyond the scope of this paper. We 
focus on BGC, an interesting case from the stigmatised mining industry (see Vergne, 2012; 
Durand & Vergne, 2015). Like many companies operating in this industry, Barrick has faced 
                                                 
6 Both concepts draw heavily on labelling theory grounded in the sociology of deviance (Erickson, 1962; Gibbs 
and Erickson, 1975; Devers et al., 2009). 
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strong resistance from key stakeholders, including the media, local community members, 
human rights NGOs and other activist organisations. 
3.2 Organisational stigma and presentation of self 
As suggested in the previous section, unlike individual stigma, organisational stigma involves 
a binary evaluation: those lacking stigma are viewed as normal or usual, and those possessing 
it are viewed as tainted or faulty (see Pozner, 2008). Like individual stigma, organisational 
stigma has negative consequences for an organisation, and inevitably compromises its image 
and identity (Devers et al., 2009). Therefore, companies are motivated to avoid these negative 
outcomes by attempting to overcome the threat of organisational stigma and repairing their 
image through various stigma-management strategies (Hudson & Okhuysen, 2009). 
Controlling information about stigma through disclosures is therefore central to whether the 
organisation is considered discreditable or discredited (Page, 1984). However, the extent to 
which discrediting events are disclosed and made (in)visible to the audience depends on the 
organisation’s perception of the magnitude of those events, and the potential consequences of 
stigma to its image and identity (see Walker, 2008). Accordingly, the elements they choose to 
reveal or conceal are intended to manage stigma strategically (Wolfe & Blithe, 2015). 
Organisations may use various strategies to attempt to conceal information about their failure, 
justify their position or present themselves in ways that impress their audiences (Benoit, 1995). 
Benoit (1995, p.vii) proposes a theory of image restoration strategies, based on the premise that 
organisations engage in recurrent patterns of communicative behaviour designed to reduce, 
redress or avoid damage to their image and identity from perceived wrongdoing in the 
aftermath of a crisis. 
3.2.1 Stigma management: Image restroration strategies 
Benoit’s (1995) typology of image restoration strategies helps focus on a stigmatised 
company’s crisis communication tactics, especially responses and messages designed and 
communicated to improve an image tarnished by stakeholders’ criticism and suspicion in the 
aftermath of a crisis (1995, p.3). According to Benoit (1995, p.22), in seeking to address issues 
of responsibility and repair a damaged image, an organisation will employ five possible 
strategic responses: denial, evasion of responsibility, reducing offensiveness, corrective action 
and mortification. Benoit (1997) further classifies these crisis communications and strategic 
responses for image restoration into three groups: denial, evasion of responsibility, and 
reducing offensiveness. In relation to our study, the ongoing crisis at North Mara site forced 
BGC and its subsidiary in Tanzania (Acacia Mining) to produce statements intended to shield 
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the company from the crisis, such as denial and counter attack, excuses, dissociation, bolstering 
and refocusing attention. 
A denial strategy is often mobilised to refuse responsibility for wrongdoing or avoid 
blame after a crisis (Benoit, 1995). According to Benoit (1995, p.75), individuals or 
organisations forced to defend themselves against suspicion or attacks may deny performing 
the wrongful acts or undesirable actions. This may entail a simple denial of the offence, or 
shifting the blame (or responsibility) to another person or organisation (Benoit, 1995), for 
example by attacking the accuser. The aim of this strategy is to deny the wrongdoing and repair 
the spoiled image. This relies on creating ‘new beliefs about the accuser to undermine the 
attack’ (Benoit, 1995, p.29), so the audience or stakeholders are supplied with (new) 
information that undermines the accuser. 
In using an evasion strategy, an organisation may be unable to deny some responsibility 
for the failure, and will thus communicate messages that reduce its responsibility for the crisis 
(see Benoit, 1995). Through this strategy, a stigmatised company may wish to show that it has 
limited responsibility for the failure or crisis. This may also entail tactics such as defeasibility 
(using lack of control or information as tactics to reduce responsibility for the crisis) or 
provocation (suggesting that the accused company was forced into the crisis, as it had no other 
way out; Benoit, 1995). 
According to Benoit (1995, p.6), ‘excuses are accounts in which the accused admits that 
the act was wrong in some way, but does not accept full responsibility for the act’. Companies 
often use this strategy to shield themselves from the blame and associated stigma of a crisis. In 
their responses, stigmatised companies may try to show that they are not to blame for the crisis, 
or that it was caused not by them but by another organisation or by other groups of actors 
(Benoit, 1995, p.28). A stigmatised company may also mobilise a series of complex defensive 
tactics in order to further evade or reduce responsibility for the crisis, in the hope of reducing 
damage to its image and identity. For example, the company may claim that an (uncontrollable) 
event helped to bring about the crisis, and therefore it cannot be held ‘solely responsible’ for 
the damage (Benoit, 1995, p.27). Furthermore, organisations may adopt the ‘accident’ tactic to 
evade responsibility. They may try to excuse themselves from the crisis by explaining that the 
action happened ‘accidentally’, or that the act was performed with ‘good intentions’ but 
unfortunately led to the unintended crisis (Benoit, 1995, p.27). 
A bolstering strategy can be mobilised to reduce the negative effect of crisis and stigma, 
by refocusing the audience’s attention away from the wrongful act (Benoit, 1995). This 
involves the organisation taking steps to reinforce its previous commitment to the audience by 
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referring to its past actions (e.g. community investment initiatiatives). It invokes aspects of 
‘positive memories’ in order to minimise negative feelings toward the most recent act of 
wrongdoing, which may improve its organisational image. As Benoit (1995, p.77) posits, 
‘while the amount of guilt or negative affect from the crisis remain the same, increased positive 
feelings toward the actor may help to offset the negative feelings towards the act, yielding a 
relative improvement in the actor’s image’. 
Benoit (1995) suggests that individuals or organisations may employ apology and 
corrective measures strategies as ways of taking full responsibility for failures. However, in 
many cases they prefer not to use these strategies (see Coombs, 2007), because apologising 
may mean accepting full responsibility for the wrongdoing, thereby deepening the legitimacy 
crisis and doing further damage to their image and identity (Coombs, 2007). According to 
Coombs (2007, p.163), this strategy may be deemed ‘too risky for their identity and image 
assets during a crisis’. Indeed, organisations are keen to protect their image and identity, as 
damage to these may affect stakeholders’ behaviour in potentially unfavourable ways, 
ultimately affecting their financial performance (Coombs, 2007, p.164). Adopting an apology 
strategy will invariably inflict some damage on their image. 
Reflecting on Goffman and Benoit, in managing the effect of stigma, our premise is that 
accounting and CSR reporting, in particular, may play a major role in (re)constructing a spoiled 
image and reinforcing social relationships with stakeholders (Walker, 2008). Indeed, a 
stigmatised company may be keen to employ various image restoration strategies in attempting 
to manage issues of visibility versus concealment (see Walker, 2008). We argue that, faced 
with image crisis situations, companies may use CSR communications to demonstrate their 
responsiveness and sensitivity to social demands and to construct a consistent and credible 
image. As Grougiou et al. (2016) suggest, CSR reports broadcast important signals of 
institutional congruence which are highly likely to mask, or at least distract attention from, core 
stigmatised activities. Therefore, CSR disclosures may be proactive and/or reactive defence 
mechanisms employed by stigmatised firms to cushion the impact of negative evaluations of 
their operations and reduce or manage social disapproval (Vergne, 2012; Elsbach, 1994; 
Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Philippe & Durand, 2011). 
4. Background, scope and research methods 
4.1 Backround of the selected case study 
We focus on BGC, one of the largest and most highly visible transnational mining companies 
in the world, and its subsidiary in Tanzania, Acacia Mining (formerly known as African Barrick 
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Gold – ABG). BGC has its headquarters in Toronto, Canada and a portfolio of mining and 
exploration projects in the United States, Canada, Australia, Peru, Chile, Argentina, the 
Dominican Republic, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Zambia and Tanzania. The 
company was founded in 1983 by Canadian entrepreneur, Peter Munk, and its shares are listed 
on the New York, London and Toronto stock exchanges. Acacia Mining provides a typical case 
study of how ongoing social and environmental crises in local communities may lead to serious 
image threats and legitimation challenges. Specifically, we focus on North Mara Gold Mine 
(NMGM), a mining site owned by Acacia Mining in Tanzania. NMGM is located in northwest 
Tanzania, in the Tarime district of the Mara region about 12 miles south of the Kenyan border.7 
Conflict at this mine goes back to 2002, when a Canadian company, Placer Dome, took full 
ownership and control of mining in the district, forcing out all artisanal miners in the area. 
Many of these had been working there for generations but had no legal claim to the land, either 
because they were ignorant of the law or because they had no money to pay for licence fees 
(Curtis & Lissu, 2008; Lauwo et al., 2016). 
BGC acquired North Mara in 2006 when it took over Placer Dome. In February 2010, 
BGC sold its shares in Africa to ABG, a new company listed on the London Stock Exchange, 
with headquarters in London. In 2014, Barrick changed the name ABG to Acacia Mining plc, 
a company based in London that still focuses on the African continent and is still 64 per cent 
owned by BGC. Acacia Mining has since become the largest foreign direct investor in 
Tanzania, having invested over US$2.5 billion in the country over the past 15 years, 
representing around two per cent of total Tanzanian gross domestic product in 2015.8 However, 
whilst the change of name to Acacia dropped ‘Barrick’ from the company’s title, Barrick’s 
underlying majority holding remains unaltered. In other words, Barrick retains exactly the same 
holding in Acacia as it did in ABG immediately prior to the name change. As BGC’s website 
underlines: 
Acacia Mining plc is a company listed on the London Stock Exchange that owns gold 
mines and exploration properties in Africa. Barrick holds a 63.9% equity interest in 
Acacia.9 
Astonishingly, despite indicating that it owns the majority of shares, Barrick has made 
several attempts to distance itself from Acacia Mining, as stated in its sustainability report 
(Barrick, 2015, p.7): ‘due to the decision to exclude Acacia Mining plc from the Responsibility 





Report, Tanzania is not included in our 2014 or 2015 data’. Indeed, apart from the name change, 
there appear to be relatively few significant legal differences between the previous ABG and 
the present Acacia Mining. For example, the composition of the board of directors remains the 
same,10 and the president of BGC (the parent company), who was chairman of ABG’s board 
of directors, is also chairman of Acacia’s board of directors. Therefore, Barrick’s name change 
indicates how the organisation has sought to present itself to the outside world and attempted 
to decouple itself from stigmatised practices (Vergne, 2012). It may have been a strategy to 
shield itself from the local disputes and conflicts attached to operations in Tanzania. Goffman 
(1963, p.25) argues that there are times when ‘the stigmatized feels uncertainty ... during mixed 
contacts the stigmatized individual is likely to feel that he is “on”, having to be self-conscious 
and calculating about the impression he is making, to a degree and in areas of conduct which 
he assumes others are not’. According to Goffman (1963), in attempting to make an impression, 
stigmatised individuals or organisations may opt to ‘conceal their identity’ (1963, p.79). This 
may be viewed as an attempt to manage and control stigma and minimise adverse impressions 
conveyed to others. 
Owing to the crisis at North Mara, Barrick’s operations in Tanzania have been under 
scrutiny by the media and human rights NGOs for many years, which may have significantly 
impacted on the company’s performance, image and identity. According to Blas (2013), 
‘nothing portrays better the crisis engulfing Tanzania’s mining sector than the plight of BGC 
and its subsidiary company ABG, the London-listed company that has all its precious metals 
mines in the East African countries’. This report emphasises that: 
Its shares have lost more than 60 per cent this year; its chief executive has left, and it 
has announced a review that includes cost-cutting and job losses to try to weather a 
perfect storm of rising costs, electricity shortages, higher taxation and lower gold 
prices11. 
The operations of ABG (now Acacia Mining) at North Mara site have been criticised for 
environmental destruction, political corruption, community struggles, human rights abuses and 
the creation of serious health problems (see Christian Aid, 2008). 
We selected NMGM as a case study because of the ongoing conflict and violence 
reported in local communities (Christian Aid, 2008; Curtis & Lissu, 2008; Lauwo & Otusanya, 
2014; Lauwo et al., 2016). Civil society organisations, including human rights NGOs (e.g. 




Mining Watch Canada and RAID), the media and local residents, have expressed concerns 
about ongoing social unrest, human rights abuses and unresolved conflicts at NMGM, 
stemming from forceful evictions of local people who previously owned land and mining 
rights. 
4.2 Research methods 
To address our research objective, we conducted a qualitative case study of archival data 
relating to the crisis at North Mara site.12 According to Yin (2003), a case study is the most 
appropriate research method for an exploratory study seeking to address ‘how’ or ‘why’ 
questions. As mentioned in the previous section, the conflict at North Mara site over social and 
environmental issues has been under the spotlight of the media and human rights NGOs for the 
past 15 years. Our analysis was therefore geared at examining ‘the crisis at North Mara site’ 
and how Barrick and Acacia Mining have employed various strategic responses in attempting 
to respond to this crisis. Our period of interest was from 2006 to 2015, which corresponded 
with a series of events in the company’s history. This timeframe was considered relevant as 
BGC had undergone some important structural changes. For example, it acquired North Mara 
in 2006, and in 2010 created ABG to manage operations in Africa, including North Mara mine 
site. The name change from ABG to Acacia Mining took place in 2014.13 As discussed in the 
previous section, despite changes to its name and organisational structure, BGC remains the 
parent company, holding the majority of shares in Acacia Mining plc. 
We employed a modified form of content analysis to collect and analyse archival 
materials referring to the ‘crisis’ at North Mara. This modified form has been widely used in 
previous accounting literature, for example to examine emerging narratives and discourses in 
the aftermath of crises (see Detzen & Hoffmann, 2018; Gendron & Spira, 2010) and 
developments in accounting regulation (see Canning & O’Dwyer, 2013; Malsch, Gendron, & 
Grazzini, 2011; Shapiro & Matson, 2008; Suddaby, Cooper, & Greenwood, 2007). 
Accordingly, this approach focused on exploring both manifest evidence, in the form of visible 
and obvious components expressed in the text, and latent evidence of underlying meanings in 
                                                 
12 A case study allows investigation of a contemporary phenomenon in a context in which the boundaries between 
the phenomenon and the context are blurred and multiple sources of evidence are employed (Yin, 2003). 
13 The company’s operations include exploration, development, mine construction and operations. It has reserves 
and resources of approximately 30 million ounces of gold. The company has three productive mines, all located 
in northwest Tanzania (Bulyanhulu, Buzwagi and North Mara), and a portfolio of exploration projects in Tanzania, 
Kenya and Burkina Faso. Bulyanhulu is an underground gold mine with shaft and ramp access. Buzwagi is a low-
grade bulk deposit with a single large open pit. North Mara is a combined open pit and underground operation 
from two deposits, Gokona (underground) and Nyabirama (open pit). 
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the text (see Canning & O’Dwyer, 2013; Suddaby et al., 2007). In line with Detzen and 
Hoffmann (2018), our initial analysis focused on the manifest content, specifically on 
narratives and other information relating to the ‘crisis at the North Mara site’. We collected 
information from newspaper articles, government reports (Tanzania’s National Environmental 
Management Council – NEMC), reports by think tanks, human rights NGOs and international 
organisations (e.g the World Bank) and blogs, which provided documentary evidence on the 
crisis at North Mara. All the documents gathered for analysis were written in English, not in 
the native language, Swahili. Therefore, no translation issues were encountered. We screened 
these documents for relevant contextual information and themes relating to social and 
environmental incidents reported at North Mara from 2006 (when Barrick took ownership of 
the mining rights in Tanzania) to 2015. We only selected texts that aimed to make a case that 
Barrick’s operations in Tanzania, and specifically at North Mara, might be socially flawed, i.e. 
discredited by the audience (see Goffman, 1963). At this stage, our interest was in identifying 
and capturing the magnitude of the social and environmental problems at North Mara site and 
the associated threats created by the crisis to Barrick and Acacia Mining, as reported in the 
documents. While looking for themes relating to flaws in Barrick and Acacia Mining, we used 
‘crisis at north Mara’ as a keyword. We then used Benoit’s image restoration typology to 
classify the strategic responses to the negative evaluation deployed by Barrick and Acacia 
Mining. Our interest lay in categories and subcategories of text and words used in letters and 
other correspondence from Barrick to the media and human rights NGOs (particularly Mining 
Watch and RAID), as well as in company reports and websites. Our final units of analysis 
included six newspapers articles (Daily News, The Guardian, The Citizen, The Nation, The 
Telegraph, This Day); five reports from two human rights NGOs (Mining Watch Canada and 
RAID); two reports from NEMC; four blogs (Bloomberg News, Reuters, Financial Times 
and protestbarrick.net), and Barrick’s and Acacia/ABG’s annual reports, CSR reports and 
websites. 
The second stage of our analysis focused on the latent content of evidence, involving 
interpretative content analysis that focused on understanding and explaining what the texts and 
narratives talked about and their underlying meanings. According to Berg (2004, p.107), this 
type of analysis involves an interpretative reading of representations underlying physically 
presented data, and thus focuses on ‘the deep structural meaning conveyed by the message’. At 
this stage we were interested in capturing texts, words or phrases that would reveal the stigma-
management techniques and related arguments employed by Barrick and Acacia Mining in the 
aftermath of potentially adverse problems at North Mara. Our initial clues to the data were 
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based on the theoretical framework developed earlier. The passages were analysed thematically 
by the three authors independently, guided by Goffman’s (1959, 1963) concepts of stigma and 
presentation of self and Benoit’s (1995) typology of image restoration theory. Refining our 
categories of responses entailed studying the words, texts and styles used in the responses, 
which required us to incorporate elements of discourse analysis (see Beattie, 2014) and to 
contextualise the documents both historically (from 2006 to 2015) and socially (see Detzen & 
Hoffman, 2018). Despite their differences, content and discourse analysis have some overlap 
and often complement each other (see Beattie, 2014). Our analysis also entailed the researchers 
separately re-reading and interpreting the evidence collected from multiple sources, including 
detailed excerpts from the materials, and then engaging in a joint discussion of the results until 
a consensus was reached on their meaning. Detailed reading of the evidence led to the 
identification of key themes, including denial and refocusing attention, evading responsibility, 
image bolstering, excuses and dissociation. This enabled us to see how negative evaluations 
were either resisted, concealed, managed or rationalised. 
We acknowledge that our analysis may be limited by our interpretations of the texts, 
words and phrases, which were grounded in Goffman’s (1963) writings on stigma and 
presentation of self and Benoit’s (1997) image restoration strategies. As Berger and Luckman 
(1966) suggest, the meanings of such material are subject to multiple interpretations depending 
on the theoretical lens adopted. Thus, our analysis offers possible explanations for strategic 
responses to organisational stigma using Barrick and Acacia/ABG as our case study. 
5. Findings 
5.1 The crisis at North Mara site: Stigma mirroring 
NMGM, one of Barrick’s smallest mine sites, operates as both an open pit and an underground 
gold mine in the Tarime District of the Mara Region of Tanzania (Curtis & Lissu, 2008; Lauwo 
& Otusanya, 2014). As explained in the previous section,  North Mara has been one of the most 
controversial mining sites in Tanzania, with protests dating back to 2002, when Placer Dome 
Tanzania purchased the site from the Tanzanian government. As Goffman (1963, p.15) 
suggests, stigma attributed to an individual (or organisation in our context) may draw attention 
to that individual, and may thus have some form of negative impact on those with whom the 
individual interacts. The stigma at North Mara has been attributed to legacy issues, historical 
community grievances and social unrest over many years at the North Mara site, as a result of 
the mass displacement of local communities who originally depended on artisanal mining to 
make room for the transnational mining company’s operations (see Chachage, 1995; Curtis & 
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Lissu, 2008). The local community’s grievances at North Mara have also been attributed to 
land and compensation disputes, pollution and environmental problems, arguments over 
economic benefits and, more recently, allegations of sexual assault by police and security 
guards at the mining site (see Curtis & Lissu, 2008; Lauwo & Otusanya, 2014; Nyakeke, 
2013a). In addition to contributing to stakeholders’ negative social evaluation of the mining 
site and its stigmatisation, these problems have led to numerous conflicts in the area. As Devers 
et al. (2009) suggest, a stigmatised organisation is marked as deviant, and is perceived to be 
emblematic of the negatively evaluated category to which it is linked. Thus, its values are often 
seen to conflict with those of the stakeholder group. 
As a result, the stigma attached to North Mara escalated conflict in the area. For example, 
in 2008, one villager was shot dead by the police when a group of 200 villagers allegedly broke 
into the North Mara mine site looking for gold in the pit and waste rocks for re-processing (The 
Guardian, 2008). In 2009, a chemical spill at Barrick’s mine in the Mara region reportedly 
contaminated the Tigithe River, which supplies water to local communities around the mine 
area, impacting on health and prompting calls for the operation’s closure (This Day, 2009). 
One local newspaper reported that a series of health-related issues might be linked to toxic 
spills from NMGM, severely affecting local villagers and animals living around the mining 
areas: 
… already, scores of people residing around Barrick’s North Mara Gold Mine are 
showing serious signs of exposure to pollution in the form of water contaminated with 
various chemicals allegedly flowing out of the mine and into the nearby River Tigithe 
... the villagers accuse the mine management, under the Canadian investor company, 
of causing fatal health hazards to human beings, livestock, and land, where the mine 
is located (This Day, 2009). 
Thus, as the crisis continued to unfold at North Mara, a succession of events placed the 
company under greater scrutiny by various stakeholders. For example, the media reported that 
water samples taken from the Tigithe River in North Mara contained high levels of nickel, 
chromium and lead, which posed a high health risk to people and animals drinking the river 
water.14 In a report on local community concerns about poor waste management systems at the 
mining sites that might have a significant impact on the environment, one newspaper observed: 
The tailing ponds are not often furnished with liners to prevent toxic water leaking 
and seeping into the rivers and other natural water sources. For example, the villagers 
of Nyamongo in Mara region have been complaining about contamination of Tigithe 
                                                 
14 At least 43 villagers and 1,358 livestock were reported to have died from consumption of poisoned water which 
leaked from the mining tailing dam into the nearby Tigithe River (The Guardian, 16 July 2009). 
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River since 2002, but the government waited until 2009, a year before the general 
election, to investigate the local community concerns (Mnyanyika, 2009). 
When asked to respond, Barrick denied the health issues and deaths of villagers, blamed the 
villagers for stealing the PVC lining from the mine’s waste pond, and reported only four 
chemical-related wildlife mortalities for the whole of 2009 at its North Mara site (Nyakeke, 
2013b). This suggests that it was trying to avoid the negative outcome of the reported scandal 
and the threat of stigma. As Hudson (2008, p.252) suggests, core stigma drives many 
organisations to adopt strategic responses such as denying and concealing, in order to manage 
their collective organisational image and to protect their identity from the taint of association. 
Despite Barrick’s denial of health issues relating to toxic spills at North Mara, pressure from 
NGOs, the media and local people increased, forcing Tanzania’s NEMC to respond by ordering 
the company to close the site’s tailing storage dump (which stores dirty water and waste from 
processing) due to toxic leakages and contamination of local water sources (Nyakeke, 2013a). 
The National Assembly of Tanzania then ordered the government to conduct a study to 
determine whether NMGM was polluting the Tigithe River, the source of drinking water for 
more than 250,000 local people. The government accepted ‘in principle’ that a study should be 
conducted, and stated that minimal environmental monitoring had been carried out in the area 
because the NEMC had only 20 environmental inspectors for the entire country. In February 
2010, the Tanzanian government reported to the media that it had finally agreed to allocate 
funds to conduct research into the deaths of people and livestock near the Tigithe River in 
North Mara (The Citizen, 2010). In June 2010, after more than six years of public outcry, the 
government, through the Minister of State in the Vice President’s Office (Environment 
Department), issued a public statement confirming that the Tigithe was indeed polluted and 
that the water was unfit for human and animal consumption (The Citizen, 2010). 
Following changes to Barrick’s environmental programme, and as a result of 
environmental auditing, the Tanzanian government later declared the Tigithe River pollution-
free and suitable for human consumption. A government spokesperson stated: 
The water is potable and suitable for human consumption. Barrick had replaced 
40,000 square metres (430,000 sq ft) of liner within their effluent pond, which they 
claim was destroyed by vandalism (Bariyo, 2010). 
This claim of vandalism again illustrates Barrick’s employment of a denial strategy, through 
the tactic of shifting blame (see Benoit, 1995): the liners had allegedly been destroyed by 
vandalism, leading to the problem of polluted water. Reflecting on Benoit’s (1995, p.24) 
typology, this denial appears to have been used in combination with a strategy of ‘shifting the 
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blame’ in order to minimise the ‘amount of negative affect associated with the offensive act’. 
Contrary to the government’s statement, it was reported in The Guardian that: 
There is weakness in the auditing system; the audit of mining activities is poor, 
corruption is also high, people are getting paid under the table. We need a coalition of 
non-state organisations like civil society organisations and religious leaders to demand 
to follow up what is going on in the mining companies (The Guardian, 2009). 
In 2010, Barrick was again in the media spotlight over the killing of local community 
members at the North Mara site, where security guards and police were accused of shooting 
and killing seven people who were scavenging the waste piles (Simpson, 2010). Surprisingly, 
Barrick’s local subsidiary (ABG) ‘denied the allegation’ and ‘shifted the blame’ by describing 
the killings as the act of a group of ‘criminal intruders’ who had allegedly entered the mine site 
with the intention of stealing gold ore (Simpson, 2010). Reporting on the crisis at North Mara 
mine, Bloomberg News stated that at least 19 villagers had been killed by police and security 
guards at North Mara between early 2009 and mid-2011, and that Barrick disagreed with this 
figure but was refusing to provide its own estimate (Simpson, 2010). 
After many years of grievances and ongoing conflicts in local communities surrounding 
the mine site, Mining Watch Canada and RAID campaigned jointly against the excessive use 
of force by mine security and police, and the human rights abuses at the North Mara site. This 
culminated in a lawsuit against ABG, launched in the UK high court by UK-based Leigh Day 
in July 2013, accusing it of complicity in the deaths of local villagers. Only after Leigh Day 
began to communicate with ABG in the lead-up to filing the suit did NMGM implement a 
grievance mechanism to deal with victims of the use of excessive force by mine security and 
police (Mining Watch Canada, 2014). Although ABG had denied the killings of local people 
and human rights abuses at the site, claiming that violent intruders had been involved, in 2015 
Acacia Mining Plc reportedly settled the case out of court without disclosing the terms (The 
Guardian, 2015). However, Mining Watch and RAID (2014, p.2) claimed that the remedy 
mechanism was flawed, stating in a joint report that: 
ABG’s grievance mechanism for victims of violence by police or mine security does 
not appear to be rights-compatible, although ABG deny this and claim to have 
reviewed its grievances mechanism to ensure compliance. ABG’s use of legal waivers 
means that compensation is dependent on the victim signing away their right to pursue 
civil legal action against the company. Participants interviewed by Mining Watch and 
RAID not only expressed dissatisfaction with the remedy they have been offered, but 
also confirmed that they had not understood when they signed the compensation 
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agreements that they had lost the right to pursue their claims in legal proceeding 
against the North Mara Mine and Barrick/ABG15. 
In 2014, after many reported incidents, Barrick decided to change the name of its 
operation in Tanzania from ABG to Acacia Mining. This may have been another strategy to 
‘dissociate’ or decouple itself from the crisis at North Mara and the stigma attached to the site. 
Stigmatisation creates major challenges for organisations’ survival, as stigmatising audiences 
often confront them (see Hudson & Okhuysen, 2009). This may be linked to what Goffman 
(1959, p.59) refers to as ‘stigma symbols’, which are especially effective in ‘drawing attention 
to a debasing identity discrepancy, breaking up what would otherwise be a coherent reduction 
in our valuation of the individual’. Indeed, Barrick’s decision to change the name to ‘Acacia’ 
might be viewed as a means of moving away from a ‘stigma symbol’ and disassociating itself 
from the cause of the stigma (see Goffman, 1963). 
In summary, NMGM, one of the smallest of ABG/Acacia’s subsidiary companies in 
Tanzania, faced a series of socioeconomic and environmental crises, which severely damaged 
the company’s image and identity. Andon and Free (2012) argue that crises raise questions 
about an organisation’s past, present and future functioning and challenge its conduct, image 
and legitimacy. Like many stigmatised organisations, Barrick and its subsidiary adopted stigma 
management strategies in an effort to conceal or distance themselves from identities they 
perceived as socially undesirable and to manage the effect of stigma. The next section examines 
Barrick/Acacia’s response to the crisis at the North Mara site. 
 
5.2 Barrick/Acacia’s strategic response to the crisis at North Mara site 
The previous sections have shown that Barrick and Acacia were facing serious crises at 
NMGM, which have had serious implications for the organisation’s image and identity. Barrick 
and ABG had to devise a mix of image restoration and stigma management strategies to manage 
this crisis and repair their damaged image, including denial, excuses, evasion and dissociation, 
to enable them to cope with the situation they faced. These strategies were deployed 
systematically in response to stakeholders’ negative social evaluation (resulting from criticisms 
and attacks by the media and NGOs) and to attempt to gain social approval (Mishina & Devers, 
2012). As Goffman (1963, p.69) argues, in the presentation of self, stigmatised entities may 
employ communication techniques such as ‘innuendo, strategic ambiguity, and crucial 
                                                 
15 https://www.business-humanrights.org/sites/default/files/documents/letter-on-north-mara-22-april-2014.pdf 
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omissions’ to manage the effects of stigma on their image and identity, which may allow the 
performer ‘to profit from lies without, technically, telling any’. Benoit (1995) also suggests 
that organisations are motivated by negative image(s) to attempt to restore the damage and 
build their reputation using various communication strategies. 
Denial 
In reaction to massive criticisms of its operation at North Mara, Barrick’s first public 
communication was to deny any responsibility for the reported social and environmental crisis 
there. For example, in 2011, Barrick’s website stated that: 
There is a great deal of misinformation circulating in the local community at North 
Mara, and being reported by media. Barrick and African Barrick Gold (ABG) have 
been unable to verify a number of allegations circulating involving Tanzanian police 
activity. The police are the appropriate authority to confirm or deny those allegations. 
We are continuing to focus our efforts on re-establishing a constructive dialogue with 
the local community and also continuing our efforts to work together to improve the 
situation in the area surrounding our property. Further updates and information will 
be provided as required (Barrick, 2011b). 
This statement suggests that, rather than accepting responsibility for the crisis, Barrick’s 
experience of ‘spoiled image’ led it to choose a denial strategy, as a way of distancing itself 
from the negative outcomes of the scandal and manage its organisational image (see Hudson 
& Okhuysen, 2009). As Goffman (1963, p.57) argues, as long as the stigma is concealed 
through decisions such as ‘to display or not to display, to tell or not to tell, to lie or not to lie’, 
an individual (or organisation) may remain discreditable. Reflecting also on Benoit’s (1995, 
p.24) typology, this strategy may have been used to minimise the ‘amount of negative affect 
associated with the offensive act’. 
In response to longstanding and well-publicised allegations of excessive use of force by 
mine security and police, involving the shooting of 65 civilians and injuries to villagers (York, 
2016), Acacia again issued a statement to the media which directly denied the allegations and 
disputed the figures (Yeomans, 2017).16 In its statement, Acacia instead mentioned that there 
had been 32 ‘trespasser-related’ fatalities over a two-year period between 2014 and 2016 
(Acacia, 2016a). Thus, despite the reported evidence (see York, 2016), Barrick and Acacia 
chose to disclose little information on the shootings, and instead mentioned in their 




sustainability report (2016) that there had been six ‘intruder’ fatalities in 2016, two of which 
related to police involvement: 
We are deeply disappointed that there were six intruder fatalities at North Mara. There 
were two security-related trespasser fatalities, both a result of confrontations between 
police and trespassers (Acacia, 2016a). 
In this statement, while denying the accusation of civilian shootings, Acacia also provided new 
evidence that it was not ‘civilians’ who had been shot by the police and mining security guards, 
but rather ‘intruders’. Again, Acacia appears to have used a variant of denial, while at the same 
time shifting the blame to the villagers, calling them ‘intruders’ and ‘trespassers’, in order to 
avoid any wrongdoing, as well as protecting its image (Benoit, 1997). Benoit (1997, p.3) 
suggests that shifting the blame may be a chosen strategy to ‘undermine the credibility and 
impact of the accusations’ and ‘shift the audience’s attention away from the alleged 
wrongdoing of the original target to the new prey’. It may also be used to make disgraceful 
information appear less offensive (Benoit & McHale, 1999). According to Benoit (1997, p.75), 
‘whether the accused denies the offensive act actually occurred or denies performing any 
wrongful act, either option, if accepted, should obsolve the actor of culpability’. Thus Barrick 
and Acacia chose to avoid any responsibility for the unfolding problems at North Mara to elude 
the anticipated threats associated with stigma (see Hudson, 2008). 
Continued allegations of human rights abuses at North Mara dominated newspaper 
headlines, and provoked further criticism and pressure from local and international human 
rights activists and NGOs. This inevitably continued to erode Barrick/ABG’s legitimacy 
(Scherer et al., 2013; Zyglidopoulos & Fleming, 2011). Responding to mounting pressure, and 
to address the image threat, in 2011 Barrick issued a statement expressing its distress over the 
reported human rights atrocities: 
Barrick is deeply distressed by the evidence that has emerged. Barrick policies, and 
those of ABG, are unambiguous in their requirements. Both companies are aligned in 
their zero tolerance approach to human rights violations. For both companies, any 
employee implicated in human rights violations or other serious criminal acts will be 
terminated. Any employee who has direct knowledge of but fails to report human 
rights violations, or other serious criminal acts, of employees or public security will 
be terminated. Any employee who misleads or hinders investigators inquiring into 
human rights violations or serious criminal acts will be terminated.17 




Interestingly, in this response, for the first time Barrick showed some empathy for the 
situation at North Mara. However, rather than accepting any responsibility for the reported 
human rights crisis or suggesting corrective measures to deal with the problems, it focused on 
underlining its commitment to human rights policies and how its subsidiary was keen to train 
the security forces on human rights issues. Again, this strategy may have been used as a way 
to contain the disapproval and manage its spoiled image (see Vergne, 2012). As Goffman 
(1963) suggests, when evaluated negatively, an organisation may frame the meaning that 
organisational members attach to the stigma through its communications so that it is viewed in 
an alternative way. However, this did not solve Barrick’s problems, but further contributed to 
its legitimacy crisis. 
As social unrest at North Mara continued to be reported by the media and NGOs, pressure 
on the company from human rights NGOs intensified (see Mining Watch Canada, 2014), 
culminating in a lawsuit in the UK high court.18 In response, Barrick again denied any 
wrongdoing, and instead attacked the media and NGOs for their inaccurate reports. For 
example, it confronted Mining Watch Canada and RAID with the fact that their criticisms of 
the problems at North Mara, and specifically of the lack of ‘transparency’ in its grievance 
remedy mechanisms, were based on their own misreading of the term as used in United Nations 
Guiding Principle 31(e). In its correspondence, ABG’s representative stated: 
… In your letter you continue to accuse ABG of not being transparent with respect to 
remedies that NMGM has provided in connection with alleged incidents of the use of 
excessive force and sexual violence by police and site security personnel against 
individuals intruding on the mine site … We appreciate that civil society has an 
important role to play in monitoring and helping improve company perfomance in that 
regard … We are disappointed that you have largely overlooked or misportrayed our 
responses, and chosen to ask many of the same questions again in your recent letter 
… Your apparent view that transparency should trump the need for confidentiality is 
problematic … your concerns regarding the confidential nature of the grievance 
resolution agreement appear misplaced (Vice President Corporate Affairs, ABG letter, 
11 March 2014). 
Barrick also issued another statement explaining why it had decided that it could not release 
any information about the sexual assault allegations or the remedy paid to affected third parties. 
In a letter to RAID and Mining Watch Canada, ABG stated: 
ABG is unwilling to provide the information you have requested about specific 
remedies and levels of financial compensation provided to women complainants. 
                                                 
18 https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2017/07/23/acacia-mining-faces-legal-claims-mine-site-deaths/ 
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Barrick has been very clear from the outset that no wrongful act was performed at 
North Mara, and justified the reason for non-disclosure of the disputes and remedy 
paid.19 
Barrick continued to deny the allegations, and refused to disclose information on the 
compensation paid to the victims. Again, it may have used this strategy in an attempt to distance 
itself from the stigma and associated image threats. As Goffman (1963, p.53) suggests, during 
a performance, the individual (or organisation) rarely expresses any disturbing facts; although 
these may be present, they are silenced. This also reflects Hecht and Faulkner’s (2000) 
argument that when an organisation discloses potentially stigmatising information, its image 
and identity become vulnerable to damage. Thus, Acacia chose not to disclose information on 
the financial compensation paid to the victims of sexual assault, which would have indicated 
that they had been to blame for the crisis (Benoit, 1997). 
In responding to the reported problems of pollution and environmental degradation at 
North Mara, Acacia also repeatedly denied claims that its operations, and specifically the toxic 
chemicals discharged from its tailing storage facility, had been polluting the environment, 
endangering people’s lives and causing livestock deaths (Nyakeke, 2016).20 In its media 
communication in response to complaints from local residents and community leaders living 
around North Mara regarding discharges of toxic waste, it simply issued a denial, stating that 
‘there was no evidence supporting these allegations’. As Benoit (1997, p.75) suggests, denial 
may be supplemented with explanations of apparently damaging facts or lack of supporting 
evidence. Surprisingly, in a statement in February 2016 responding to a Business & Human 
Rights Resource Centre enquiry regarding allegations of contamination of water sources 
around North Mara mine, Barrick stated: 
North Mara Gold Mine Ltd (NMGML) hosted a visit by the Deputy Minister for 
Environment to conduct additional water samples and is currently awaiting the results 
of these samples. NMGML already has a comprehensive sampling programme in 
place in and around its licence areas and in relation to any water discharge. Any water 
discharged from the operation complies with the applicable regulatory requirements 
and is monitored regularly by the responsible authority. Allegations of human and 
livestock deaths in the area have been investigated by NMGML, in addition to the 
National Environmental Management Council and a Parliamentary Committee, and 
there was no evidence supporting these allegations.21 






This statement reinforced Barrick’s intention to boost its image by denying any responsibility 
for the environmental issues, in an attempt to avoid the stigma and distance itself from the 
reported problems. According to Benoit (1995), when an individual or organisation is accused 
of wrongdoing, it may first opt to simply deny committing the offensive action in the hope of 
protecting its image. However, as the pollution crisis continued to unfold, Barrick/Acacia 
sought to repair the damage done to their image by using further denial tactics, while at the 
same time emphasising the maintenance of good relationships with the local community. The 
CEO’s statement provides an example: 
This year we have focused on improving our relationships with both the communities 
around our mines and with the Government. As part of this, we have engaged more 
actively with the community ... We invest in communities through both the Acacia 
Maendeleo Fund, which supports our broader company initiatives across Tanzania 
and Kenya, and our Village Benefit Implementation Agreements, which provide for 
specific investments at North Mara to fulfil legacy commitments (Acacia, 2014, p.8). 
These statements reveal that Barrick repeatedly adopted a denial strategy to distance itself from 
responsibility for the social and environmental crisis reported at North Mara. Indeed, it denied 
the allegations of human rights abuses, pollution and environmental degradation, and attempted 
to divert attention away from the crisis by presenting positive information on its social 
commitments. This accords with Benoit’s (1995) suggestion that when an individual or 
organisation is accused of wrongdoing, it may first opt simply to deny having committed the 
offensive action, in the hope of protecting its image. 
 
Evasion of responsibility 
According to Benoit (1995, p.76), those who are unable to deny performing the act in question 
may be able to evade or reduce their apparent responsibility for it. In this case study, despite 
many years of social unrest in the local communities, it was not until 2011, as pressure 
intensified from NGOs, that Barrick’s reports admitted serious problems at North Mara. Its 
sustainability report stated that: 
ABG recently notified Barrick that it had received highly disturbing allegations of 
sexual assaults by the police and security against local women ... As a response, ABG 
has also been pursuing enhancements to its human rights program generally, in 
parallel to Barrick commencing its new human rights compliance program. 
Employees raised these allegations to external investigators retained by ABG to 
inquire into an unrelated matter (Barrick, 2011c). 
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This statement implies that, rather than accepting responsibility for human rights problems, or 
even implementing corrective measures to address the ongoing human rights crisis, Barrick 
employed an evasion strategy to distance itself from its spoiled image (see Hudson & 
Okhuysen, 2009). Consequently, rather than addressing the magnitude of social and 
environmental problems at North Mara, Barrick instead underlined its commitment to human 
rights to avoid association with the stigma (Hudson, 2008). This was intended to shift attention 
away from the negative stigma and replace it with a stronger positive image of its commitment 
to human rights issues. Such disclosures continued as criticisms of Barrick/Acacia’s human 
rights atrocities continued to unfold (see Lauwo & Otusanya, 2014; Christian Aid, 2008). For 
example: 
We encounter human rights allegations and security challenges at North Mara mine 
in Tanzania, a mine site operated by our affiliate ABG. Working with the international 
NGO Search for Common Ground, ABG has been moving forward with a 
comprehensive strategy to address issues at this operation and develop conflict 
resolution and human rights training in the region. This strategy, which features 
increased community investment, supports greater social and economic development. 
It builds on efforts to address legacy issues, increase awareness of human rights and 
improve community infrastructure in such areas as education and access to water. 
ABG has tripled its investment in community development initiatives to US$10 
million annually in Tanzania and, most recently, signed agreements valued at US$8.5 
million with seven villages surrounding the North Mara mine (Barrick, 2011c). 
Although Barrick admitted in its sustainability report that it had been encountering challenges 
in Tanzania, particularly at North Mara, it chose to redefine the situation for the audience, using 
a bolstering strategy to evade responsibility and bolster its image (Benoit, 1997). Again, rather 
than accepting responsibility for the social and environmental crisis at North Mara, Barrick 
chose to refocus attention on community development initiatives. It highlighted its 
commitment to the local community to deflect attention from the crisis at North Mara. 
Reflecting on Goffman (1963), through community engagement, Barrick was able to manage 
its performance with significant (societal) others and create an image that common goals could 
be achieved through dialogue and ‘open’ communication. 
Barrick chose to refocus the attention of its audience on other facts, as well as on its 
values and worthwhile projects in the local community (Benoit, 1997). In addition to Acacia’s 
report that ‘we continued to make good progress across Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
and Community Relations initiatives’ (see above), its 2015 annual report stated that: 
In 2015, we continued our efforts to publicise the availability of the Grievance 
Mechanism at all the sites and encouraged the reporting of any grievances through 
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this Mechanism. As a result, we have seen an increase in the registration of some 
categories of grievances, including human rights grievances. … The majority of these 
grievances are at North Mara and relate to land issues at North Mara, where 
speculative investments have delayed the land compensation/resettlement 
programmes as well as intruder related and human rights related grievances. Whilst 
our assessment is that a number of these grievances are not justified, we are 
encouraged by the increased usage of the Grievance Mechanism which demonstrates 
that this Mechanism is accessible and seen as a credible option by members of the 
communities in which we operate (Acacia, 2015, p.44). 
This statement suggests that Acacia chose to focus on positive information as a way to conceal 
the stigma (see Hudson, 2008) and avoid being more discredited by its audiences (Goffman, 
1963) in the aftermath of the crisis. This echoes Goffman’s (1963, p.32) argument that a 
‘stigmatized individual can use his disadvantage as a basis for organizing life, but he must 
resign himself to a half-world to do so’. According to Goffman, the individual ‘may develop 
to its fullest his sad tale accounting for his possession of the stigma’ (1963, p.32). In other 
words, Barrick acknowledged that it had been stigmatised, and thus adopted the narrative that 
it had been wronged in some way by society or even the audience. 
Although greater disclosure of the magnitude of the crises at North Mara and corrective 
strategies employed to address the problems might have been expected, Barrick appears to have 
chosen a strategy of evading responsibility for the problems, and instead shifted attention to its 
community investment initiatives. For Benoit (1995), corrective action (taking measures to 
prevent an event from recurring) is a viable strategy, as it helps a company to address the source 
of the problem and explain how changes will eliminate recurrences, and to implement a 
remediation plan. According to Erickson, Weber and Segovia (2011), when companies use 
communication strategies other than corrective action, management reporting may lack 
transparency, suggesting that management is not taking full responsibility for the crisis. 
Benoit (1995) suggests that in seeking to repair a damaged image, individuals or 
organisations may wish to evade or reduce their apparent responsibility for the crisis rather 
than using outright denial. Similarly, Barrick’s CEO acknowledged that mining activities often 
impinge on human rights: 
Businesses, even ones that strive to act responsibly, can contribute to negative human 
rights impacts ... At the North Mara mine in Tanzania, our affiliate African Barrick 
Gold is working with Search for Common Ground (SFCG), a leading international 
non-governmental organization, in a number of areas including human rights training 
for local police, aligned with the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights 
(Barrick, 2012, p.7). 
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Again, in this case, rather than providing factual information on the extent of human rights 
atrocities and accepting responsibility for the social and environmental crisis at North Mara, 
Barrick adopted a strategy of bolstering its image, to demonstrate its limited responsibility for 
the crisis. This echoes Goffman’s (1959) argument that individual or organisational visibility 
is always contingent on building and maintaining ‘normal appearance’ and ‘proper 
performance’. Stephens, Malone and Bailey (2005, p.391) also suggest that communication 
strategies are used to ‘manage meaning, represent the organization, build trust and credibility, 
and manage uncertainty’. A similar situation appears to have been reflected on Acacia’s 
website, except that Acacia made more general references to ‘challenges’: 
Operating in some areas of Tanzania requires Acacia, as well as the Tanzanian 
Government and the local communities, to deal with law and order issues. A number 
of these issues have been related to specific events such as instability in areas at the 
time of elections, while others are longer term challenges such as trespass and 
vandalism by intruders seeking to unlawfully take gold and other property from our 
operations. These challenges vary depending on the location of the operation and other 
circumstances. Acacia has implemented, and continues to identify, alternatives to 
manage these security issues in a manner that places at its heart the safety and security 
of people, property and assets (Acacia, n.d.)22. 
Once again, Acacia appears to have mobilised a defensive tactic in order to avoid or reduce its 
apparent responsibility for the crisis (see Benoit, 1997). As Durand and Vergne (2015, p.1208) 
argue, a firm in a stigmatised industry may seek different ways to mitigate the negative 
consequences of media attacks. In this case, Acacia chose to refocus attention on managing the 
issues at North Mara, giving priority to community welfare, rather than accepting responsibility 
for the ongoing social unrest and environmental problems reported in the media and by NGOs. 
Like other stigmatised organisations, Barrick and its subsidiary in Tanzania attempted to 
(re)construct their image by strategically choosing what to reveal and conceal, with the 
intention of managing stigma (see Vergne, 2012). 
 
Excuses 
According to Benoit (1997), in using an excuse strategy, the actor admits that the act was wrong 
in some way, but does not accept full responsibility for the act (Benoit, 1997, p.6). Benoit 
(1995, pp.31-32) further argues that an audience’s attitudes may be difficult to understand and 
unravel, as an organisation may have dealings with various audiences. Messages intended for 
                                                 
22 https://www.acaciamining.com/sustainability/our-material-areas/security-and-human-rights.aspx 
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one audience may not persuade or be appropriate for another, and may make the situation worse 
for the organisation. Therefore, a stigmatised organisation may strive to improve its image with 
different sections of its audience. Similarly, Barrick/Acacia used the excuse strategy as a way 
of reducing the ill feeling experienced by stakeholders as a result of the social and 
environmental crisis at North Mara. Although crises had occurred there for many years, Barrick 
did not acknowledge them in its CSR disclosures until May 2011: 
Barrick Gold Corporation, and its affiliates and subsidiaries, operate in some of the 
most challenging environments in the world. Among Barrick’s operations and 
affiliates, the Mara region of Tanzania, in which African Barrick Gold (ABG) owns 
and operates the North Mara mine, is especially challenging. The North Mara mine is 
located in a very remote, underdeveloped part of the country in close proximity to the 
Kenyan border. In-migration from other areas and countries is rampant and law 
enforcement capacity is limited, making the area a magnet for transients, criminals 
and organized crime. Civil unrest due to poverty is a particular problem in the area, a 
fact widely recognized by Tanzanian authorities. The vast majority of people living 
near North Mara share the same desire for security and safety as ABG and its 
employees. (Barrick, 2011a). 
However, rather than admitting failure and accepting responsibility for the crisis, ABG used an 
excuse strategy as a way to manage the disapproval and perhaps repair its tainted image (see 
Benoit, 1997). As Benoit (1997, p.77) also posits, a person accused of wrongdoing may attempt 
to use defensive tactics, such as excuses, to reduce the degree of ill feeling and offence 
experienced by the audience. In an effort to further manage the effect of stigma associated with 
the social and environmental problems at North Mara, ABG also shifted the blame by stating 
that it was operating in a ‘challenging’ environment, reproducing the paragraph above in 
response to a letter from Mining Watch Canada and RAID (2014) regarding the non-judicial 
remedy programme at North Mara site. In its response, ABG added that: 
NMGM strives to ensure that its operations create opportunities and do not cause or 
contribute to negative impact on neighbouring communities. NMGM recognises that 
where individuals believe they have been negatively affected by the mine’s operations 
they should be able to seek a remedy and has accordingly provided for a non-judicial 
Grievance Mechanism since 2009. Given the mine’s remote location and the 
population’s limited access to judicial remedies, the mine’s Grievance Mechanism 
plays an important role in enabling members of the communities surrounding the mine 
to have their grievances heard and addressed where appropriate. 
These statements suggest that, rather than disclosing information on the impacts of mining 
operations, especially to local communities, Barrick instead diverted readers’ attention from 
the crisis at North Mara to the more important issue of how the company was making a more 
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positive impact on the local community. For example, it was providing opportunities for 
‘grievances’ to be heard, acting as a quasi facilitator in securing justice for ‘affected’ 
communities. This echoes Benoit’s (1995, p.31) argument that actors must be in a position to 
understand the audience’s beliefs about them, in addition to the values associated with those 
beliefs, in order to move toward repairing a stigmatised image. In these statements, the message 
was extended to various audiences, with the purpose of either reducing the company’s 
responsibility for the crisis by creating a perception that it was taking action in suggesting 
‘remedies’ (although with no suggestion of corrective action through promises or 
performance), or reducing the seriousness of the crisis (Benoit, 1995, 1997). In so doing, 
Barrick and its subsidiary may have been trying to conceal information that associated them 
with the stigma, to minimise disapproval (see Hudson, 2008) and to protect their identity and 
image. Members of stigmatised industries may adopt concealment tactics (Hudson & 
Okhuysen, 2009) and typically avoid any media coverage that publicly reemphasises their 
association with the tainted industry (Devers et al., 2009). 
Barrick also issued further statements in attempting to excuse itself and convince the 
audience that the crises in Tanzania were not unique. The CEO’s communication stressed: 
A number of mining projects and operations around the world, including our own, are 
facing social conflicts and there are many reasons behind them. Now more than ever, 
communities, mining companies, civil society, and governments need to come 
together in open and respectful dialogue. We do this in a number of ways, including 
through community roundtables, the implementation of grievance mechanisms at all 
of our sites, and multi-stakeholder initiatives (Mining Watch Canada & RAID, 2014, 
p.7). 
This suggests that, like many other organisations, Barrick’s instinct was to engage in recurrent 
patterns of communicative practices with the intention of reducing, redressing or avoiding 
damage to its reputation (or face or image) from perceived wrongdoing (see Benoit, 1995, 
p.vii). As argued in the literature, stigmatised organisations may seek to preserve or repair their 
organisational identity and image by producing texts, statements and other rhetoric that 
communicate reassuring information regarding contested practices or related activities (see 
Desai, 2011; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). As Barrick operates in a stigmatised industry, any 
minor failings on its own part or on that of its subsidiary in Tanzania might ‘be interpreted as 
a direct expression of its stigmatized differentness’ (Goffman, 1963, p.26). Therefore, as its 
operation at North Mara was already stigmatised, it tried to reassure the audience that it was 
careful in its activities, and any other failings were expressed and explained through its 
stigmatised identity. This entailed producing counter-assertions challenging that practices were 
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inappropriate, disputing claims regarding negative events, blaming actors outside the field, and 




In crisis communications, a dissociation strategy is used to decouple the organisation from the 
image threats associated with the crisis (Coombs, 2013).  In our case study, Barrick and Acacia 
adopted a similar strategy of dissociation in attempting to detach themselves from the crisis 
and the associated stigma at North Mara. For example, in 2014 Barrick issued a statement that: 
Barrick and Acacia Mining plc (formerly African Barrick Gold) are parties to a 
relationship agreement that regulates various aspects of the ongoing relationship 
between the two companies to ensure that Acacia is capable of carrying on its business 
independently of Barrick. Consistent with this agreement, Acacia independently 
manages its CSR programs and issues its own annual CSR Report. As such, effective 
as of year-end 2013, our annual Responsibility Report no longer includes Acacia 
(Barrick, 2014a, p.2). 
This implies that Barrick attempted to reduce its connection to the crisis at North Mara in a 
number of ways. As Pozner (2008, p.141) suggests, fear of being tainted by relationships with 
socially damaged others may motivate actors to distance themselves from those associated with 
organisational misconduct. The use of the word ‘formerly’ in Barrick’s statement clearly 
suggests that this relationship had ended (Benoit, 1995), dissociating itself from the tainted 
company (see Leary & Schreindorfer, 1998). Furthermore, Barrick’s responsibility report did 
not include Acacia’s CSR practices, which was a direct attempt to eliminate its connection to 
previous stigmatising events with which Acacia was connected, echoing Goffman’s (1963) 
removal of a damaging ‘stigma symbol’. Similarly, Durand and Vergne (2015) argue that 
stigmatised companies have strong incentives to be discreet and evade any public emphasis on 
their association with the tainted industry to ward off unwanted scrutiny. 
In addition, Barrick sought to further dissociate itself from the stigma and reduce its 
responsibility for the crisis by identifying its subsidiary, Acacia, as being reponsible for the 
crisis (see Coombs, 2013). In so doing, it issued another statement emphasising that: 
Due to the decision to exclude Acacia Mining plc from the 2014 Responsibility 
Report, Tanzania is not included in our 2014 data. However, Acacia data for 2011–
2013 are included in the global totals for each data set (Barrick, 2014a, p.3). 
36 
This statement implies that Barrick was uninvolved in the ongoing social and environmental 
problems at North Mara and should not be blamed for the crisis (Coombs, 2013). This is in line 
with Sutton and Callahan’s (1987) argument that, in the face of crises, one possible 
organisational strategy is disassociation from the stigmatised group in order to reverse the 
transfer and remove the stigmatisation. According to Hearit (1995), dissociation seeks to 
redefine the crisis situation so that the organisation is viewed as less responsible for the crisis. 
As human rights concerns at NMGM continued to unfold, Barrick attempted to further 
dissociate itself from its subsidiary’s operations in Tanzania. Although it claimed to have 
divested a proportion of its equity interest in Acacia Mining Plc in March 2014, reducing its 
interest to 63.9 per cent (Barrick, 2014a, p.4), it remained the parent company, holding the 
majority of shares. In managing its front-of-stage performance (Goffman, 1963), Barrick used 
the financial tactic of reducing equity interest to make it appear to be no longer a majority 
shareholder. With respect to the change of name, Acacia’s CEO stated that: 
In order to further embed and reflect this approach, our shareholders voted to change 
the Company’s name to Acacia Mining from African Barrick Gold on 26 November 
2014. Our ambition is that, through the adoption of this new name, all of our people 
and external stakeholders become aligned with our new approach and goal of 
becoming a leading African mining company. We have already seen evidence that this 
is happening as the new approach is put into action (Acacia, 2014, p.1). 
This echoes Leary and Schreindorfer’s (1998) argument that to manage a tainted image and 
avoid anticipated threats associated with a stigma, an organisation may seek to dissociate itself 
from (by avoiding, excluding, ostracising, or otherwise minimising interaction with) the 
organisation perceived to be stigmatised. Thus, changing the name from ABG to Acacia 
suggests that Barrick was attempting to conceal its identity and disconnect itself from the 
stigma at North Mara. 
To further dissociate itself from past stigmatising events, Barrick’s first Conflict-Free 
Gold Report (Barrick, 2014b) stated that ‘this report does not cover Barrick’s affiliate Acacia 
Mining Plc (“Acacia”) and its Tanzanian mines (Bulyanhulu, Buzwagi and North Mara). 
Acacia will issue its own Conflict-Free Gold Report in accordance with its independent 
reporting processes.’ Surprisingly, Barrick used the term ‘affiliate’ in referring to Acacia, 
despite owning 63.9 per cent of Acacia’s shares. In its 2015 Responsible Mining Report, 
Barrick repeated: 
We do not report on data from Acacia Mining plc (formerly African Barrick Gold). 
Barrick and Acacia are parties to a relationship agreement that regulates various 
aspects of the ongoing relationship between the two companies to ensure that Acacia 
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is capable of carrying on its business independently of Barrick. Consistent with this 
agreement, Acacia independently manages its corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
programs and issues its own annual CSR Report. As such, effective as of year-end 
2013, our annual Responsibility Report no longer includes Acacia (Barrick, 2015, 
p.5). 
This statement implies that Barrick was attempting to decouple itself from the taint and 
stigmatisation of connection with the North Mara crisis and avoid the anticipated image and 
identity threats (see Hudson & Okhyusen, 2009; Devers et al., 2009). Echoing Coombs (2013) 
argument that, a dissociation strategy tries to define the situation so that the organisation in 
question appears to be less responsible for the crisis.  In so doing, it strove to conceal practices 
that affirmed negative evaluations by potentially stigmatising stakeholders (see Hudson & 
Okhyusen, 2009) by distancing itself from its subsidiary. Thus, Barrick appears to have been 
attempting to reduce the negative effects of its reputational damage at North Mara by using a 
dissociation strategy. Coombs (1999) also notes, an organisation’s crisis response may be 
viewed as a symbolic resource that can be used to protect its reputation and affect stakeholders’ 
future interactions with the organisation by shaping perceptions of the crisis and the 
organisation itself. 
From our analysis, it is clear that Barrick engaged in a variety of stigma management 
strategies to manage threats to its image and minimise disapproval. Through the various 
materials that we have analysed and the application of our theoretical framework, which 
borrows from Benoit’s and Goffman’s rich work, we have demonstrated that Barrick and 
Acacia used a number of defensive tactics in attempting to either conceal, transform or resist 
any stigma associated with their operations and repair their spoiled image. We suggest that a 
rich range of strategies may be used when undertaking stigma management (see Goffman, 
1963). Our analysis shows that strategies involving blatant denial and evasion of responsibility, 
explicit use of excuses and claims to be operating in challenging environments, and 
employment of dissociation strategies to decouple themselves from image threats appear to 
have been well-orchestrated for their audiences. However, Barrick did not use the strategy of 
apology, as this would have meant admitting guilt, which in turn would have rendered it 
stigmatised. Goffman’s and Benoit’s combined framework allows us to see behind these 
carefully structured strategies to reveal how an organisation under image threats may realign 
itself to remove any connection with and trace to stigmatising activities. This, in turn, may 
present a more favourable image to outside audiences. 
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5. Conclusion and summary 
This study has explored how a stigmatised mining company operating in a developing country, 
namely Tanzania, mobilised accounting disclosures, and specifically CSR reporting, to manage 
its spoiled image and identity in the aftermath of social and environmental crises. In general, 
stigmatisation of the mining industry derives from the nature of its core activities, as large-
scale extraction of minerals has been discredited for causing social, humanitarian and 
ecological problems (see Hudson, 2008). For example, many environmentalists classify mining 
companies as stigmatised for destroying local environments and strongly contributing to global 
warming (see Hampel & Tracey, 2019). Using BGC and its subsidiary in Tanzania as a case 
study of a stigmatised company, our analysis focused on the period from 2006 to 2015, which 
corresponded with a series of structural and historical changes in the company’s life. Drawing 
on Goffman’s (1959, 1963) writings on ‘stigma’ and ‘presentation of self’ and Benoit’s (1995) 
image restoration theory, alongside data collected from a modified form of content analysis of 
archival materials, we have examined organisational-level strategies employed by Barrick and 
Acacia/ABG to manage the effect of stigma and minimise disapproval. We have found that, in 
order to survive, Barrick and its subsidiary tried to protect themselves from the negative effects 
of stigma by using various stigma management and image restoration strategies. 
This study contributes to the literature in three major ways. First, it extends previous 
literature on corporate legitimacy crises and CSR reporting (Bebbington et al., 2008; Brennan 
et al., 2013; Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2007; O’Donovan, 2002) by bringing insights from a 
stigmatised mining company operating in a developing-country context. It shows various 
organisational-level tactics mobilised to manage the effect of stigma in the aftermath of a crisis. 
The study goes beyond previous literature that has focused on how legitimacy crises shape the 
quantity and range of information and the language used in social and environmental 
disclosures to manage public image (see Cho et al., 2010; Milne & Patten, 2002; O’Donovan, 
2002; O’Dwyer, 2002). The study provides evidence of how a stigmatised mining company 
devised various defensive stigma management tactics in an effort to conceal, transform or resist 
the effect of stigma. Our analysis reveals that, rather than accepting responsibility for the crisis 
or admitting their own blame and apologising for the social and environmental problems at 
North Mara, Barrick and its subsidiary instead used denial, refocusing of attention, evasion of 
responsibility, image bolstering, excuses and dissociation strategies (Benoit, 1997). In so 
doing, Barrick hoped to distance itself from the crisis, conceal the threats of stigma and repair 
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its spoiled identity. Our analysis also suggests that its predominant strategies were denial, 
evasion of responsibility and refocusing of attention. Therefore, despite evidence of social 
unrest, human rights abuses, environmental degradation and other social ills reported by the 
media and human rights NGOs, Barrick/Acacia produced public statements that denied or even 
defended such allegations. 
Second, in response to calls made in the previous literature (see Arora & Lodhia, 2017; 
Bebbington et al., 2008; Unerman, 2008; Unerman & Chapman, 2014), we foreground the 
concept of organisational stigma (Hudson & Okyusen, 2009; Warren, 2007; Devers et al., 
2009) to show the potential impact of stigma on how an organisation presents itself to its 
audiences. Our framework therefore makes a contribution to the accounting literature by 
conceptualising the construct of organisational stigma to show how stigmatisation originates 
at an organisational level. In the stigmatised mining company in Tanzania, this organisational 
stigma necessitated the mobilisation of various strategies to reframe the meaning attached to 
the stigma by pressure groups and other stakeholders, so that it was viewed more constructively 
(see Tracey & Philips, 2016). Whereas most previous accounting literature has focused on 
stigma at the individual level (see Detzen & Hoffmann, 2018; Neu & Wright, 1992; Solomon 
et al., 2013; Walker, 2008), focusing on organisational-level stigma has enabled us to illustrate 
how crises at a local country level may create adverse contexts and stigma that necessitate a 
corporation’s use of a mixture of defensive strategies to manage the effects of stigma and 
restore a damaged image. 
Third, we extend the limited literature on social and environmental disclosures that has 
used Benoit’s (1995) typology to analyse the nature of strategic responses to crises (Bebbington 
et al., 2008). Our analysis illustrates the unfolding of various attempts by Barrick and its 
subsidiary to maintain a positive image and to repair damage attached to the stigma through 
effective deployment of various strategic responses. Unsurprisingly, our analysis reveals that 
Barrick neither apologised nor offered any corrective action to avoid recurrence of similar 
problems in the future, as this would have entailed accepting responsibility for wrongdoing 
(Goffman, 1963). Echoing the sentiments of Tracey and Philips (2016, p.758), in the face of 
crises, one possible path for an organisation is to disassociate itself from the stigmatised group 
in an effort to reverse the transfer and remove the stigmatisation. This may result in presenting 
a more favourable image to its audiences. 
Reflecting on the literature, organisational stigma is closely related to other distinct 
concepts such as legitimacy (see Devers et al., 2009; Hampel & Tracey, 2017, 2019; Jensen & 
Sandström, 2015). For example, when an organisation is evaluated negatively by its audiences, 
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some scholars characterise the organisation in question as illegitimate (Glynn & Marquis, 
2004), stigmatised (see Devers et al., 2009; Hudson & Okhyusen, 2009) or both (see Fiol & 
Kovoor-Misra, 1997). It follows from this literature that legitimacy is a positive construct that 
must be pursued by organisations, as those lacking it will inevitably suffer in terms of their 
ability to make favourable connections with stakeholders (Suchman, 1995).23 On the other 
hand, unlike legitimacy, which categorises organisations as either legitimate or non-legitimate, 
organisational stigma is based on negative social evaluations by a critical mass of stakeholder 
group members, and deindividuates the organisation in question (Devers et al., 2009). In 
accounting, the extant CSR literature has focused mainly on the issue of legitimacy and how 
CSR narratives can be mobilised to offer organisational legitimacy, but more empirical and 
theoretical research is needed to extend organisational stigma to this literature. 
Future research in accounting should develop richer theoretical explanations of the 
difference between legitimacy and organisational stigma. We suggest that further research is 
necessary to more fully understand how and what causes organisational stigmatisation to 
diffuse from a critical mass of stakeholders into the broader organisational environment (see 
Devers et al., 2009; Jensen & Sandström, 2015). Specifically, fuller exploration of the 
differences between event stigma and core stigma, and how event(s) stigma may become core 
stigma, would be insightful (Jensen & Sandström, 2015). Research is also needed to show how 
this critical mass is reached, and how the group initiating the stigmatisation process tries to 
spread its beliefs among other stakeholders. We also suggest further empirical investigation of 
stigma in accounting beyond the current focus on top management, including those directly 
involved in core processes, such as workers at the lower level who must tentatively conceal, 
transform or resist the organisational stigma (see Jensen & Sandström, 2015). While existing 
organisational and management literature has shown that organisations may manage the 
dynamics of stigmatisation by employing various tactics that allow them to cope with the effect 
of stigma (Hampel & Tracey, 2017, 2019; Hudson, 2008; Hudson & Okhyusen, 2009), more 
accounting research is needed to examine how these stigma management strategies may 
decrease disapproval levels and contribute to destigmatisation (Hampel & Tracey, 2017). 
Furthermore, to further such a direction in organisational stigma research, future studies should 
                                                 
23 According to Suchman (1995, p.574), legitimacy is a general perception or assumption that an entity’s actions 
are desirable or appropriate within a socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions. In 
general, the literature suggests that organisations gain legitimacy by conforming to normative standards 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), as well as engaging in various types of symbolic activities to deflect controversy 
and placate stakeholders (Meyer & Rowan, 1991). 
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also go beyond the research methods used in this study to incorporate more ethonographic 
approaches, such as in-depth interviews with managers and other key stakeholders to elicit their 
views and enrich understandings of the rationale for adopting different stigma management 
strategies. We argue that such a focus has the potential to extend the critical accounting debate, 
especially in areas and contexts that remained under-explored in stigmatised industries. 
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